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FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF SIM CARD
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Zayed University
College of Technological Innovation
Abu Dhabi, P.O. Box 144534
{M80006330, M80004910, Farkhund.Iqbal, Omar.AlFandi}@zu.ac.ae
ABSTRACT
With the rapid evolution of the smartphone industry, mobile device forensics has become essential
in cybercrime investigation. Currently, evidence forensically-retrieved from a mobile device is in the
form of call logs, contacts, and SMSs; a mobile forensic investigator should also be aware of the
vast amount of user data and network information that are stored in the mobile SIM card such as
ICCID, IMSI, and ADN. The aim of this study is to test various forensic tools to effectively gather
critical evidence stored on the SIM card. In the first set of experiments, we compare the selected
forensic tools in terms of retrieving specific data; in the second set, genuine user data from eight
different SIM cards is extracted and analyzed. The experimental results on a real-life dataset
support the effectiveness of the SIM card forensics approach presented in this paper.
Keywords: SIM card, Digital Forensics, Forensic tools, ICCID, IMSI
INTRODUCTION
Regardless of its role in crime (direct or
indirect), data within a mobile phone remains
crucial. A wealth of information is stored on
cell phones that includes, but is not limited to,
call history, text messages, email messages,
web pages, and photos. Mobile phone forensics,
the most challenging digital forensics field,
should be enriched with SIM card forensics.
Most of the existing research is focused on
searching for the following key evidence in a
mobile telephone:
 Calls made, including numbers
dialed, dates, and times.
 Calls received, including numbers
received, dates, and times.
 Data stored within address
book/phone book.
 SMS details.
 Pictures/video clips on the phone or
memory card.
The SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) is a
smart card that is used in mobile phones to
store user data and network information that
is required to activate the handset for use. SIM
card demand has been growing worldwide on a
yearly basis (ABIResearch, 2015) and is
expected to break the record of 5.4 billion
shipments for the year 2015 alone. Given this
widespread usage, a massive amount of
information is available for forensic
investigators.
Since the introduction of UMTS, better
known as 3G technologies, USIM cards are
favored. While SIM cards provide network
access, the tiny computer within a USIM
enables it to handle several mini-applications
and video calls if it is supported by the
network and the handset. Integrated algorithm
users are protected from unauthorized access
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to their phone lines. Furthermore, data
exchanges are encrypted with stronger keys
than those provided by SIMs. Additionally, a
USIM’s phonebook is much bigger, with the
ability to store thousands of richer contacts
that might contain email addresses, photos,
and several additional phone numbers.
SIM card forensics provide valuable
information about contacts, SMSs, call logs,
and much more. There are commercial and
open-source tools that can assist an
investigator in extracting relevant evidence
from SIM cards.
The CDR, or ‘call detailed records’ in a
SIM card, led to the arrest of the suspect
Sameer Vishnu Gaikwak in the murder of
Govind Pansare in Kolhapur earlier this year.
The records proved that the phone was active
at the time of the murder and led the police to
discover another 23 mobile phones used by the
suspect due to his frequent SIM card change.
(Indian Express September 2015).1
In another case, the fraudsters used cell
phone information to illegally transfer bank
funds. The scammer managed to transfer funds
from an online bank account of the original
post-paid subscriber through a “SIM-swap”
promotion where an existing SIM card was
replaced with a new one. This replacement
allowed the fraudster to take over the victim’s
mobile number and use it for fraudulent
activities (Manila Times, July 2015)2
In our research we aim to contribute to the
field of SIM card forensics through:
1 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-
others/suspects-sim-card-was-active-at-spot-of-
pansare-murder-police/
2 http://www.manilatimes.net/nbi-probes-sim-
card-swap-scam/199564/
 Exploring the amount of
information extracted from SIM
cards;
 Investigating whether the
extractable SIM card evidence is
tool dependent;
 Evaluating the contribution of
obtained evidence to SIM card
forensics;
 Investigating whether SIM cards
from different GSM Service
Providers offer different evidentiary
data;
A smartphone might be the key to an
entire investigation; thus, an investigator’s
task in uncovering evidence will be much
harder if it is not supported with the necessary
knowledge. Our motivation emerged from the
fact that SIM card forensics is a new field with
minor literature as far as we know. We intend
the analysis of our results to contribute to the
mobile forensic field with the essential
knowledge needed to make informed decisions
based on the tools’ actual capabilities. We also
believe that the analysis of the retrieved data
will play a crucial role in proving suspects
guilty or not.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Background information and
fundamental concepts needed to understand
SIM forensics are discussed in Section 2;
literature review is presented in Section 3.
Experimental tools and setup are explained in
Section 4; experimental results are discussed in
Section 5, followed by the conclusion and
future work in Section 6.
BACKGROUND
INFORMATION
The introduction of the Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) standard for
transmitting text, voice, and data services
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through cellular networks marked a
telecommunication revolution that affected all
aspects of our lives. Ever since the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) released their GSM 11.11 Specifications
of the SIM-ME interface in the 1990s, the
industry has experienced a radical growth. It
was initiated by the recommendation to split
the Mobile Station (i.e., Cellular Phone) into
two components: a removable Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM), which contains all
network related subscriber information, and a
Mobile Equipment (ME) that is the remaining
part of the Mobile Station, i.e.,  the mobile
handset (ETSI, 1994).
As the name implies, a SIM card holds the
identity of the subscriber, which enables users
to be registered in the telecommunication
network. In addition to identification and
authentication, the SIM card can also store the
subscriber’s contacts, messages, calls, location
information, and other subscriber-specific data.
The components of a SIM card, as explored
thoroughly by Savoldi and Gubian (2007),
include a central processor unit (CPU) and an
operating system (OS) with electronically
erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM). It also contains a Random Access
Memory (RAM) that controls the program
execution flow. Moreover, it includes a Read-
Only Memory (ROM) which controls the
operating system workflow, user
authentication, data encryption algorithm, and
other applications. The SIM card file system is
organized in a hierarchal tree structure and
resides in the EEPROM for storing data such
as names and phone number entries, text
messages, and network service settings.
The anatomy of the file system—as
demonstrated in Figure 1—includes three types
of files: Master File (MF), Dedicated Files
(DF), and Elementary Files (EF). The Master
File is the root of the file system. Dedicated
files are the child directories of the master files
such as the DF (DCS1800) and DF (GSM),
which contain network-related information,
and DF (Telecom), which holds service/carrier-
related information. Furthermore, elementary
files contain the actual data in various types,
structured as either a sequence of data bytes, a
sequence of fixed-size records, or a fixed set of
fixed-size records used cyclically. It is
important to note that all the files have
headers, but only EFs contain data (Savoldi
and Gubian, 2007).
Figure 1. SIM Card File System Hierarchy
SIM cards have certain physical dimensions
that follow the ISO/IEC 7816 standard,
managed jointly by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and
the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC). This standard is structured in 15 parts,
in which parts 1 and 2 specify in detail the
physical characteristics of the identification
Integrated Circuit Cards (ICC, SIM Cards is a
particular type of ICC) along with contacts,
location, and dimensions. Manufacturers
adopted the ISO/IEC 7816 standard and
created SIM cards in the following sizes (Singh,
2015):  Full Size, Mini, Micro, and Nano SIMs.
Full-size SIM cards were the first cards
produced and are the size of a credit card.
Shrinking in size over the years, the Mini SIM
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was introduced and was about 1/3 the size of
the previous Full-size SIM card. Smaller
versions exist now, and they are the Micro-SIM
and Nano-SIMs.
SIM cards can also be embedded into
devices (i.e., Embedded Universal Integrated
Circuit Card [eUICC]), which can be fused
directly onto a circuit board for machine-to-
machine (M2M) applications. Irrespective of
size, SIM cards possess the same internal
components and file system hierarchy
described earlier (Singh, 2015).
To help readers understand terminologies
of the data found, we list below some
definitions that were extracted and rephrased
from the Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) Technical Specifications. 3GPP (GSM)
TS 11.11.
ICCID: up to twenty digits long, this
Integrated Circuit Card Identifier uniquely
identifies a SIM card and is mainly divided
into two parts: the Issuer Identification
Number (IIN) and the Account Identification
Number (AIN). The Issuer identification is
interpreted as follows: The first two digits are
reserved for the Major Industry Identifier
(MII) (i.e., 89 for the SIM telecommunications
industry), followed by a two-digit Country
Code, in addition to a three-digit Issuer
Identifier Number. The Account Identification
Number includes four digits for the
manufacturing month/year, two digits for the
Configuration Code, six-digits for the
Individual SIM Number, and finally a
checksum digit for error-detection.
IMSI: A fifteen-digit long number, the
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier is
primarily used for signaling and messaging
over a GSM network. Similar to the ICCID,
the IMSI is structured as follows: three-digits
for the Mobile County Code (MCC), plus two
to three digits for the Mobile Network Code
(MNC), and the rest is an allocated sequential
serial number that pinpoints the Mobile
Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN).
MSISDN: with a maximum of fifteen
digits, the Mobile Station International
Subscriber Directory Number is assigned for a
subscriber to receive calls but is not signaled to
or from a device. A subscriber can have
multiple MSISDNs, and each one refers to the
full subscriber phone number, including the
country code. In general, MSISDN consists of a
Country Code (CC – up to three-digits), the
National Destination Code (NDC – up to 3
digits), and the Subscriber Number (SN – up
to 10 digits), with a maximum of 15-digits
total. MSIDSN is an optional elementary file
(i.e., Optional EF does not need to be stored
on the SIM card itself), which differentiates it
from both ICCID and IMSI (which are
mandatory fields). Own Dialing Number is a
similar service that allows mobile users to
inquire about their telephone numbers by
dialing a specific numeric code.
SPN and SDN (Service Provider Name
and Service Dialing Numbers, respectively) are
also optional elementary files that convey the
name of the GSM Network Service Provider
and the unique services it provides (i.e.,
customer care number). As per the standard, if
a network provider chooses a field to be of
variable length, then remaining digits should
be set to hexadecimal digit “F.”
TMSI: Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity. As the name implies, this is a
temporary identifier that is exchanged between
the mobile phone and the local network
nearby. The TMSI is automatically updated
when the subscriber moves between
geographical locations to avoid signal fade,
thus providing the mobility freedom supported
by GSM cellular networks.
ADN: Abbreviated Dialing Numbers refers
to the contacts list saved by the subscriber on
the SIM card. LND (Last Numbers Dialed), on
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the other hand, is associated with the most
recent number the subscriber called. Limited
by the number of contacts it can contain due
to its small capacity, a SIM can store
additional digits from ADN and LND into the
dialing extensions EXT1 and EXT2 elementary
fields. FDN, Fixed Dialing Numbers, is
similarly related to those fields in the same
way because it contains a phonebook that can
only be accessed once a specific mode is
activated. A possible scenario in which this
might be applicable is in the case of a company
SIM card that restricts outgoing calls to only
those numbers previously configured in order
to refrain staff from using the company’s assets
for personal calls. The parameters above are
also combined in a Capability Configuration
Parameters (CCP) along with the associated
mobile equipment and subscriber configuration
(Markantonakis, 2007).
SMS: Short Message Service allows
subscribers to communicate via messages that
are sent and received through the cellular
network. SMS data is considered forensically
valuable information as it contains not only
the message text exchanged but also the time,
date, sender’s phone number, and the message
status (i.e., read, unread, sent, etc.). Deleted
messages are even more valuable as it might
indicate a suspicious content worth examining.
When a message is deleted, the data it
contains is not automatically erased; yet, its
reference is marked as free space until new
data can overwrite it. SMSs can be stored on
the SIM card itself or on the Mobile
Equipment (ME). Due to the SIM’s limited
storage size, many manufacturers design their
mobile phone handsets to automatically use
their own internal storage memory instead of
SIM cards (i.e., iPhone). Others’ models differ,
and it depends on the phone software and user
settings to explicitly indicate which storage to
use. SMS, SMSP, and SMSS (Short Messages
Service, Short Message Service Parameters,
and Short Message Service Status,
respectively) are elementary files that contain
Short Message Service information such as the
address of the operator’s short message
switching center, lifetime/timeout of messages,
and coding format (Willassen, 2005).
Location information can be found by
thoroughly examining the LOCI, LAI, LAC,
RAC, and RAI voice and data communication
fields. Location Information (LOCI) includes
the Location Area Identifier (LAI), which is
comprised of the Mobile Country Code (MCC),
Mobile Network Code (MNC), and the
Location Area Code (LAC) along with the
Routing Area Code (RAC) and the Routing
Area Information (RAI).
Built-in security features can be found in
SIM cards, and these fields are established by
the use of Card Holder Verification (CHV1)
and (CHV2). These two fields restrict file
access to those users with valid verification
PIN codes (Personal Identification Numbers).
Other features control various mobile users’
access to the GSM Network, and this is
achieved by assigning a specific ACC (Access
Control Class) to each group. Encryption is
also utilized to avoid tampering and ensure
data security by the use of a Ciphering Key
(Kc) to authenticate the SIM on the mobile
network and a Ciphering Key Sequence
Number (Boudriga, 2009).
Other information related to the GSM
cellular network configuration residing in the
SIM card includes, for instance, Phase
Identifier. GSM Services were delivered in
phases where Phase 1 introduced SIM cards,
ciphering, voice telephony, international
roaming, call forwarding, and SMS services.
Further features were added at later stages
(i.e., call waiting) based on services that were
offered by the previous stage. Using the SIM
Service Table (SST) elementary file, one can
identify which services are allocated and
activated in the SIM and which are not (i.e.,
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SMS, FDN, and, and so on). Other settings
such as language preferences for menu
interaction are set using the Preferred
Languages Variable (PL). The SIM card can
also contain two Group Identifiers (GID1) and
(GID2). The GSM Service Provider is the only
entity to modify these two fields in order to
identify a group of SIM cards for particular
applications and associations. Emergency Call
Code is another service-provider specific and
can be defined to set up an emergency call, for
instance, to 999 in the event of threats. Higher
Priority PLMN Search Period (HPLMN) is
also configured by the Service Provider and
states how often the mobile equipollent should
search for the home network (range is between
6 minutes to 8 hours). Set by the service
provider, Preferred Network List (PLMN)
allows subscribers to select a network from a
pre-configured list to connect to while roaming
abroad. Forbidden Networks (FPLMN), on the
contrary, are those networks to which a phone
is not permitted to connect. A broadcast
control channel (BCCH) is a pattern that
contains system information messages of the
identity and configuration of the base
transceiver station in the GSM cellular
standard. Cell Broadcast Message Identifier
(CBMI) specifies the content of the cell
broadcast messages a subscriber would receive
by the Service Provider partners (preferred
networks). In addition to the previous
parameters, Service Providers also set the
Accumulated Call Meter (ACM) to manage
subscriber cell phone expenses before reaching
a certain maximum (ACMmax). Using a Price
per Unit and Currency Table (PUCT), the
costs can be calculated in a currency chosen by
the subscriber (Bidgoli, 2010).
LITERATURE REVIEW
SIM Forensics is still in its infancy due to the
extensive in-depth knowledge and expertise
required; hence, previous research efforts are
limited to the best of the authors’ knowledge.
There have been, some pioneering attempts
that have paved the way for SIM Forensics
which are summarized below.
Using the GSM 11.11 Technical
Specification, Willassen (2003) focused on the
subscriber’s sensitive information that can be
extracted from a SIM card. He identified 21
extractable items and demonstrated how the
GSM mobile telephone system can play a
significant role in forensics examination.
Highlighting the challenges in the field of
digital forensics, Savoldi and Gubian (2007)
provided a proof-of-concept with regards to the
possibility of data hiding in a SIM/USIM card
through various techniques that are widespread
due to the absence of a nonstandard part in
the SIM/USIM image memory. Cilardo,
Mazzocca, and Coppolino proposed a unified
architecture, “TrustedSIM,” inherently relying
on a subscriber’s identification module (SIM)
as its core component. This, according to
them, was due to the tamper-resistant domain
and flexible multiplication environment that
could manage users’ security profiles.
Given the above potential data that could
be transformed into forensically-sound
evidence, general forensic examination tools
were used to extract and recover these data.
Jansen and Ayers (2006) demonstrated that
some of these tools, however, may yield
inaccurate results because they were not
specifically designed for SIM Card Forensics.
This inefficiency may also be referred to a
programming error, utilization of an incorrect
protocol, or an out of date specification that
might lead to improper functionality. Casadei
et al (2006), on the other hand, tried to
experiment with an open-source SIM-specific
forensic tool instead of commercial and
proprietary restricted software. The researchers
presented their SIMbrush tool analysis through
conducting an experiment to extract all
observable memory and non-standard files of
the SIM Card.
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TOOLS AND
EXPERIMENTAL
SETUP
The setup for the experiment required the
arrangement of a mobile device and a SIM
card reader. We prepared two mobile devices,
an Apple iPhone 4s and a Samsung Galaxy
SIII that included an Etisalat and DU SIM
cards, respectively, in addition to an external
SIM card reader. The selection of two different
service providers was made to investigate the
difference—if any—between the various service
providers.
To complete the setup for the experiment,
data creation was required on both mobiles,
such as saving user data (i.e., contacts) to the
SIM card. For the iPhone, this was not directly
possible because by default, iPhone does not
support saving to the SIM card. The authors
have to manually move the SIM card to
another mobile device that supports this
feature (a Nokia device).  The authors
additionally set up various social media
accounts, i.e., Facebook, Instagram, Dropbox,
etc., and created dummy user data on them.
For our experiments, we planned to explore
both commercial and open source tools. The
following tools were chosen for comparison due
to their support of SIM card forensic
investigations:
EnCase Forensics: From Guidance
software, EnCase is a tool widely used in the
digital forensics field. EnCase’s Smartphone
Examiner module collects information from
different smart devices, SIM card readers, or
through device backups.
MOBILedit: a mobile forensic tool that
not only provides viewing, searching, or
retrieval from a phone; but also retrieves
information such as IMEI, OS, and firmware,
SIM card details such as IMSI, ICCID, and
location area information.
Mobile Phone Examiner: MPE from
AccessData includes an enhanced smart device
acquisition and analysis capabilities. With the
integration of nFIELD, it provides forensic
mobile device data collections that support
both USIM and SIM acquisition with reporting
abilities.
Oxygen Forensic Suite: Oxygen is
developed by Oxygen Software Company and
performs digital forensic analysis of
smartphones through the use of proprietary
protocols.
Paraben SIM Card Seizure: SIM Card
Seizure is a tool from Paraben Cooperation
that performs a forensic SIM card acquisition
and analysis with the ability to recover deleted
text messages from SIM cards.
pySIM: From TULP2G, pySIM is an open
forensic software framework for extraction
and decoding of data stored within electronic
devices.
SIMBrush: Is an open-source tool which
can be used to extract all observable memory
from SIM/USIM cards.
SIMScan: Is an open-source toolkit used
to recover SIM card information by
downloading the binary contents of individual
files and storing them as individual files.
UFED Cellebrite: UFED provides access
to mobile data and exposes every segment of a
device’s memory using advanced logical, file
system, and physical extractions. It also
provides in-depth decoding, analysis, and
reporting features.
USIMdetective: From Quantaq
Solutions, USIMDetective is a forensic tool that
has been specifically designed to manage the
complex data storage mechanisms found in
smart cards.
XRY: Is a comprehensive digital forensics
examination tool used for mobile devices. With
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its ability to grab mobile information, XRY
also retrieves specific SIM card information.
XRY Viewer is an easy-to-use tool for viewing
and accessing retrieved data.
Different tools provide different acquisition
techniques, and with respect to the above-
mentioned tools, some of them acquire SIM
card information through phone acquisitions
like EnCase, MOBILedit, Oxygen, and UFED,
while others provide the acquisition of SIM
cards through a SIM card reader like Encase,
SIM card seizure, SIM Manager,
USIMDetective, and XRY.
Table 1
Forensic Tools
Tool Version
Encase Forensics 7.09.03.40
UFED Cellebrite 4.1.2.49
Oxygen Forensic 7.4.0.121
Paraben (SIM Card Seizure) 4.0
Dekart (SIM Manager) 3.3
Quanta (USIMdetective) V3.0.4
The following table summarizes the main
specifications of the mobile phones used:
Table 2
Smartphones Used
iOS Android
Device iPhone 4s Galaxy SIII
Version 8.4.1 4.3
Model MD 258AE/A GT-I9300
EXPERIMENT
RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
Open source software were not available for
testing either due to discontinuation of the
software itself (i.e., SIMBrush) or unobtainable
download links that led to invalid owner
websites (i.e., SIMScan). The authors were
able to download pySIM, but faced an error, as
it only provided a connection through serial
socket communication, which is no longer valid
in new mobile devices.
UFED logical analyzer provided an
unexpected error when the authors tried to
test it with the iPhone 4s. Alternatively,
UFED did not support logical acquisition to
Android devices, which limited the ability to
perform an acquisition to the Samsung Galaxy
SIII mobile phone.
The results provided by EnCase with
regards to Apple iPhone 4s were available
through iTunes backup analysis only. This
option was not available for the Android
device, as EnCase was unable to read the
Samsung Android backup.
Although MOBILedit was able to connect
and read both phones, no data was retrieved
from either mobile device; however, and this
might be because it was a trial version.
Both MPE & nFIELD trial versions were
downloaded; nevertheless the authors
experienced difficulty in running these
programs due to licensing errors that
prevented the downloaded trial versions from
running.
While any recovered information that was
stored and retrieved from a SIM card is of
evidentiary value, not all tools have the
ability to retrieve or extract all of the required
information. The results of the first part of this
experiment display a comparison of the useable
tools and their ability to extract pre-defined
criteria set by the authors; we focused on 40
items of various possible extractable SIM card
information based on the Third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) Technical
Specifications (GSM) TS 11.11.
The best tools that were able to extract the
highest number of items included Paraben SIM
Card Seizure, Quantaq USIMDetective, and
XRY, respectively. Both SIM Card Seizure and
USIMDetective were able to list all the items
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in its report despite the fact that some of these
items did not contain any data value. As for
XRY, only fields with data were displayed,
which drives us to inquire whether it is a
tool/version limitation. Only fields that
contained data were reported in XRY, while in
SIM Card Seizure, all the fields in the
comparison criteria were displayed along with
additional extra fields. It was also clearly
reported that there was no data to be
displayed in that criteria. This could be due
to service provider SIM card configuration,
which led us to another area of research, and
that is to investigate more SIM cards from
different providers for comparison.
Furthermore, Paraban and USIMDetective
displayed the SIM card file system hierarchy in
a clear, simple view that made it easier to
locate and further examine each master file
and its sub-items. The latter provided an
additional HEX format view for the extracted
data that could provide a further examination
and verification means.  XRY, on the other
hand, provided two tabs with information
about the logical acquisition of SIM and USIM
(other tools presented the extracted data in
one view). The obtained content for both SIM
and USIM were identical except for an added
evidence about the Cyphering key.
Figure 2. Paraban SIM Card Seizure
Figure 3. USIMDetective
Figure 4. XRY
With the least amount of information
retrieved, EnCase, Oxygen, and Dekart SIM
Manger come at the end of the comparison.
EnCase was only able to read the iTunes
backup, and this was not a valid option for the
Android backup. EnCase comes with an extra
module for mobile phones acquisition that was
not available to the authors at the time of
conducting this experiment for the phone/SIM
card acquisition.
Oxygen was able to get basic information
about the SIM card. It differed though
between both phones as it was able to display
its own dialing number in iPhone 4s and not in
Samsung SIII. While Oxygen was able to
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display SIM contacts on both phones, there
was no visual indication that those contacts
were saved on the SIM cards. The authors
reached this conclusion as they saved those
contacts in both SIMs intentionally for testing
and experiment purposes.
With the ability to write to the SIM and
the possibility of changing the PIN code, data
extracted from Dekart SIM Manager would not
be forensically sound. Reset of the PIN code is
a debatable question as it might be required in
case of accessing a locked SIM.  Although the
authors did not manipulate any evidence data,
writing to the SIM will lead to contamination
resulting in inadmissible evidence. This feature
can also be misused by suspects to forge the
data.
Figure 5. Dekart SIM Manager
Table 3 Overview of the assessment
between the tools through the various
acquisitions that were conducted either to the
mobile devices or to the SIM cards.
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Table 3
40 Evidentiary information and tools capability to extract them.
SN SIM CardInformation
Tool
XRY Paraben Oxygen Dekart USIM Det. EnCase
Etisalat DU Etisalat DU 4S SIII Etisalat DU 4S SIII 4S SIII
1 ICCID      - - -  x - xx
2 SPN     - - - -  x - xx
3 MCC     -  - -  x - xx
4 MNC     -  - -  x - xx
5 MSIN     - - - -  x - xx
6 MSISDN  *    -    x  xx
7 IMSI     - - - -  x - xx
8 LDN * *   - - - -  x - xx
9 LOCI     - - - -  x - xx
10 LAI     - - - -  x - xx
11 ADN          x  xx
12 FDN * *   - -    x - xx
13 SMS * *   - -    x - xx
14 SMSP     - - - -  x - xx
15 SMSS * *   - - - -  x - xx
16 Phase     - - - -  x - xx
17 SST * *   - - - -  x - xx
18 LP *    - - - -  x - xx
19 CHV 1 & 2 * *   - - - - - x - xx
20 EXT1 * *   - - - -  x - xx
21 EXT2 * *   - - - -  x - xx
22 GID1     - - - -  x - xx
23 GID2     - - - -  x - xx
24 CBMI * *   - - - -  x - xx
25 PUCT * *   - - - -  x - xx
26 ACM * *   - - - -  x - xx
27 ACMmax * *   - - - -  x - xx
28 HPLMNSP * *   - - - -  x - xx
29 PLMNsel     - -    x - xx
30 FPLMN * *   - -    x - xx
31 CCP * *   - - - -  x - xx
32 ACC * *   - - - -  x - xx
33 BCCH * *   - - - - - x - xx
34 Kc     - - - -  x - xx
35 Kc Seq. # * *   - - - -  x - xx
36 Emergency Call Code * *   - - - - - x - xx
37 Own Dialing Number  -    -   - x  xx
38 TMSI     - - - -  x - xx
39 RIA     - - - - - x - xx
40 SDN * *   - - - -  x - xx
*  Please refer to the discussion section.
x  USIMDetective was unable to read DU SIM card information, displaying an error that this card does not seem to support 2G or 3G mode
communication.
xx  EnCase was unable to read Android backup
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In the second part of this experiment, the
authors were eager to pursue actual data that
SIM cards might contain (again with reference
to the 40 criteria items previously chosen). For
this purpose, the authors used the XRY tool to
extract actual data from 8 different SIM cards.
The cards were accessed logically using the
tool and its reader and the following segments
were extracted:
ICCID: 89971122126964102877
8 9 9 7 1 1 2 2 1 2 6 9 6 4 1 0 2 8 7 7
 89 is interpreted as the Major
Industry Identifier
(Telecommunications
administrations and private
operating agencies)
 971 as the Country Code (i.e.,
United Arab Emirates)
 12 is the Issuer Identifier and that
is Etisalat.
 212696410287 is the Individual
Account Identification number
including the month/year of
manufacturing, Configuration code,
and SIM number.
 7 is the Checksum calculated from
the other 19 digits.
The ICCID is engraved on the SIM itself to
uniquely identify the chip internationally and
cannot be changed or updated later, which
makes it a reliable data source from a forensic
point of view. Also, using the Issuer Identifier,
investigators could contact the service provider
identified by the ICCID to get the logs of a
certain suspect/victim after getting a search
warrant for further analysis.
For the International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier (IMSI), it is interpreted as follows:
IMSI: 424021445434857
4 2 4 0 2 1 4 4 5 4 3 4 8 5 7
 424 reflects the Mobile Country
Code, in this case, the United Arab
Emirates.
 02 refers to the Mobile Network
Code, which is the Emirates
Telecommunications Corporation
(Etisalat).
 The remainder of the digits signify
the Mobile Subscriber Identification
Number (1445434857).
Both the ICCID and IMSI can be used to
identify a specific subscriber and are of great
forensic value since examiners can approach
mobile network providers and obtain all data
records of a potential suspect/victim (i.e.,
subscriber).
The Mobile Station International
Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN) was
extracted as well, and it contains the following
info:
MSISDN: +971505682881
9 7 1 5 0 5 6 8 2 8 8 1
 971 represents the Country Code
(United Arab Emirates)
 50 identifies the National
Destination Code (Mobile Phone by
Etisalat)
 5682881 refers to the Subscriber
Number
It is noteworthy to know that other than
the ICCID, the information contained within
the SIM can be modified later (i.e., MSISDN)
and hence, the reliability of such evidence is
sometimes questioned in a court of law.
Abbreviated Dialing Numbers (ADN) are
of significant importance since they may link
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an unidentified phone to a suspect/victim or
pinpoint possible connections and relations of
the mobile owner. Some modern mobile
phones, however (specifically the iPhone 4S
tested in this experiment) rely on the Mobile
Equipment (ME) storage to save these
numbers instead of the SIM Card itself.
Similarly, SMS data is crucial in forensic
investigations but, unfortunately, none of the
SIM cards tested in this experiment revealed
any SMSs stored on the SIM card itself. The
authors speculate that this is due to the mobile
phone manufacturers’ default settings that
prevent saving SMS data into the SIM cards
and utilize the phone internal memory instead.
On the other hand, location information
(i.e., Local Area Code: 7D97) can be used by
forensic examiners to locate where the phone
was last operating and geographically indicate
where a suspect has been or where an event
occurred.
Forensic examiners should not neglect the
possibility of combining the above information
extracted from SIM cards with other evidence
collected from the mobile phone and the crime
scene itself and construct the case accordingly.
We were able to extract the below
information from all SIM cards. The wealth of
information varied between various network
providers, which proves that the amount of
SIM card information can also be reliant on
the service provider.
 Integrated Circuit Card Identifier
(ICCID)
 International Mobile Subscriber
Identifier (IMSI)
 Mobile Station International
Subscriber Directory Number
(MSISDN) “Own Dialing Num”
 Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity (TMSI)
 Short Message Service Parameters
(SMSP)
 Last Network (LAI-MCC/MNC) &
Routing Area Network (RAI-
MCC/MNC)
 Last Area Code (LAI-LOC) &
Routing Area Location (RAI-LAC)
 Ciphering Key (Kc)
 Abbreviated Dialing Numbers
(AND)
 Service Provider Specific Fields
CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
SIM card forensics is a promising area that can
provide investigators with a plethora of
evidentiary data, given that they have the
right knowledge and tools to extract it in a
forensically-sound manner. Currently, over-the-
counter tools are generally built to aid
examiners in analyzing the mobile phone as a
whole unit, neglecting the fact that some vital
information is often left out in smaller modules
(i.e., the Subscriber Identity Module). Some of
the tools used in this paper’s experiment did
yield vital information regarding the
subscriber, but further development is needed
to ensure the reliability of the information
gathered. Having knowledge of the tools’
strengths and limitations helps investigators
develop an in-depth expertise on the right tool
to use in different situations. Forensic
examiners are advised not to rely solely on one
tool and to opt instead to cross-validate
findings.
SIM card forensics provides a vast area of
possible future work to be conducted, for
example, either verification of the extracted
data against the real data from the various
network providers, a deep extensive search
within the SIM card file system, or inspection
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of extracted data against retrieved user data
from various applications and exploring if any
of these applications embed any of the SIM
data.
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